

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TOP SECRET

TO: BUNCHE
FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 15 SEPTEMBER 1961 sent 150520Z received 150630Z
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Your unnumbered re conversation with Secretary Of State.

I am certain you have already given all the replies and reactions which this extraordinary demarche calls for. What a page in UN history. I note that it was not considered a major action in the implementation of the resolution when decent officers of Belgian nationality were expelled on the 28th, but that when we take the next step proved necessary by very bitter experiences and go for foreign outlaws under the resolution which have gone underground and remain in the Surete, this is considered a major action requiring prior approval by the US because those same fellows took action to stage and carry through a planned attack on the UN. Who are they defending and do they suppose that implementation of a resolution approved by them should be conditioned on whether or not we may meet resistance or on whether or not the final outcome may be one which does not suit their political taste?

However, the key question is this one: What have our critics done in order to bring Mr. Tshombe to his senses? What influence has the British Consul exercised on Mr. Tshombe as late as between 6 and 7 O'clock Wednesday morning when they met (see para 7 of addendum to the report)

It is better for the UN to lose the support of the US because it is faithful to law and principles than to survive as an agent whose activities are geared to political purposes never avowed or laid down by the major organs of the UN. It is nice to hear these parties urge "most strongly" that we do everything in our power to bring Adoula and Tshombe together after having gone, on our side, to the extreme point in that direction without any noticeable support at the crucial stages from those who now complain.

Generally speaking, I have one advice and that is that the major powers do not react until they know the facts and further, that they do remember that they are more likely to keep their position if they respect principles than if they expect others to break them on their behalf or

on behalf of the Welenskys. Translating into proper language, you may bring these resolutions to the notice of Dean Rusk. In 22-letter combinations, N is for the Secretary-General more important than S and that is not influenced by financial sanctions of which the future will know what to think.

It belongs to the history reconsultations that the first I knew about this development, I learnt by a tendentious Reuters report in Accra on my way to Leo.

It also belongs to the history that we did what we could through Mr. Linner under instructions from Headquarters, to avoid the personality of the Commissaire DEstat, but that this was not successful. However, Commissaire is accompanied by 2 Katangese moderates. To this should be added that Adoula is the overriding personality in the Cabinet and that he has given strict instructions, underscored by Linner, as to the attitude that should be taken by the Commissaire. What Adoula and the conservatives cannot achieve in the Congo, not even the US can in the long run hope to maintain. Anyway, if anything helps Gizenga to the position which is now so objectionable it is passivity or failure by the UN in Katanga while a success there would be the end of his possibilities for a personal power game. Thus, we for other reasons, are working in the very direction which they, I am sure for non ideological reasons want to see succeed.